

The Iraqi Kurdish Issue and the United States 1963 – 1975

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Abstract

The Iraqi Kurds had long thought efforts lobbying for the United States support for their issue in the new republic of Iraq. But the US had always turned down their efforts because of its interests with its regional allies. Hence this article examines these policy approaches and the forces shaping the operating assumption of the United States in its decision making processes regarding the Kurdish issue. This study is focus on the United States interests' policy regarding the Kurdish issue in Iraq in the context of the US's seventeen year-long Cold War rivalry with the USSR for influence in Iraq. This article outlines the history and genesis of the United States policy towards the Kurdish issue in Iraq. This study presented a noteworthy amount of positively not published details about these parties. It delivers a short history about how the United States policy interests shaped and increased in the Middle East and then in the Iraqi Kurdish issue as well. It shows how successive United States administrations managed with the Kurdish issue. This article also shows the perspectives held by the United States foreign policy in managing with the Kurdish issue. This study explores how the United States had reacted to the Kurdish issue from 1972 onwards. It further shows how successive Iraqi governments handled the Kurdish issue. Specific attention is given to relation between Iraqi Kurds, the United States interests in the Kurdish issue and successive Iraqi governments in managing the Kurdish issue, as well as their relations with each other. This study is a historical research based on qualitative study of viewpoint from some rational materials. This study is used some relevant secondary sources, which are related to this study.

Keywords: the Iraqi Kurdish issue; Kurdish political autonomy demands; successive Iraqi governments, US interests' policy in relation to the Kurds and its involvement in the Kurdish issue.

1. Introduction

Since the 1950s, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR) had become increasingly entangled in a Cold War competition for influence in the Middle East region. Due to the US armed forces acknowledged the significant role of Western access to oil from the Persian Gulf region in case of a war with the soviet, the US supported a regional approach for the Middle East that was devised to keep the Gulf, prevent the USSR from forming control over its oil reserves, also to back up the pro-Western conservative governments in the Middle East. Nonetheless, when the pro-western Hashemite kingdom in Iraq was overthrown on 14 July 1958, the United States had to reappraise its strategic approach for the Middle East while it further ensued in a Cold War challenge with the Soviet over influence on the new republic of Iraq. This competition would eventually last for seventeen years. Before the Baathist Party finally succeeded in 1975 to receive full control of Iraq (Blanke, 1995). Gibson showed that the primary incentive behind the US policy toward Iraq between 1958 and 1975 was the ‘application of the broader principal of Cold War Strategy on local developments’ it’s backed by this study (Gibson, 2013).

During this Soviet-US challenged for influence on Iraq, a fifteen- year long Kurdish War ravaged Iraq from March 1960 till March 1975. Although with repeated interruptions. After the pro-Western Hashemite kingdom of Iraq was overthrown, the United States started to examine whether the Iraqi Kurds and their Kurdish nationalism would be useful in restricting the expansion of the USSR influence in the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The United States had further an interests in the Kurdish issue in Iraq since their historic connection with Moscow. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the USSR had helped the Iranian Kurds with the establishing of the short-lived Kurdistan Republic of Mahabad in Western Iran in January 1946 (Roosevelt, 1947). This raised the United States of America concerns that the USSR might have used the Kurdish issue to circumvent American’s regional communist containment strategy (Blake, 2009; Roosevelt ,1947).

2. The United States Interests in the Kurdish Issue

With the purpose of accurately understanding US policy interest in Iraq and with the Iraqi Kurds, one should first look at the regional US interests in the Middle East after the Second World War. These US interest are primarily comprised of two strategic aims. The first, strategic aim was closely related to the western dependence on Middle Eastern oil preventing the expansion of communist influence in the Arab World. The second aims were keeping Saudi Arabia and its oil rich neighbours safely under the United States protection and influence. The oil-producing states in this region were key for the US and its NATO allies in Western Europe, because they decreased European contingency upon gas and oil from the USSR(Vis, 2014).

After the Second World War, the United States used several regional approaches for the Middle East to acquire those aims. Eventually, the United States supported the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957, which wanted to deliver the independent Arab administrations with alternative to Jamal Abdul Nasser's regional leadership. The Eisenhower Doctrine's objective was to strengthen the conservative Arab administrations while insulating USSR influence by confining Nasser. Nonetheless, during the Syrian crisis of 1957 with the aim of preventing a Syrian turnover to the Soviet Communist orbit. With the 14 July 1958 coup d'état in Iraq, where the Iraqi kingdom government had toppled and the new prime minister Abdul Karim Qassim increasingly had to count on the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) for fighting off his domestic opponents, another Arab country was in danger of being moved into the USSR orbit. These advances in Iraq and the Syrian crisis of 1957, led to another change in US policy for the Middle East from the Eisenhower government the US might from now on accommodate to pan-Arab nationalism (Blanke 1995; Vis 2014). Further, the US President Eisenhower himself felt that no region of the World received as much of his close attention and that of his colleagues as did the Middle East. There, against a background of new nations emerging from colonialism, in the face of constant thrusts of new Communist imperialism, and complicated by the old implacable hatred between Arab and others, the world faced a

serious of crisis. These crises posed a constant test to the US will, principle, and resolve (Kingssed ,1992:3)

The US National Security Council report (NSC 5820/1) that followed on 4th November 1958, would provide the core for the next three years of the US policy for the Middle East. The NSC report identified two main developments in the Middle East that were responsible for the weakening of the Western competition in the region the increase of the radical pan- Arab nationalist movement and infiltration of the USSR in the Middle East. The fundamental collapse of the pro-western conservative monarchy in 1958 in the face of pan-Arab nationalism required a shift in Western strategy.

According to the US NSC 5820/1 report, the Soviet's policy upon the Near East was designed to weaken and finally get rid of western influence using Arab nationalism as political pawns. Hence, the prevention of further communist expansion to Arab nationalism and the Near East, With the aim of securing Washington's basic aims, denial of the area to the USSR domination' also kept on supply of effective Near Eastern oil to its NATO allies in Western Europe. The United States had collaborated Nasser on regional where the United Arab Republic (UAR) was directly involved. The NSC pressed also outlined US policy regarding countries in the Middle East, which had a neutralist position in the Cold War, as evidence the Iraqi Republic headed by Qassim. Whilst seeking pro-Western orientation approved neutralist policies of countries in the area when necessary.

Upon Iraq, the NSC showed specifically advised to keep on friendly relations upon a complementary basis. Moreover in case of a feasible Iraqi exit from the Baghdad Pact, the United States was devised to comply. Ultimately, US relations with the Kurds in Iraq were directly contingent upon Washington's relations with Qassim's administration and the Cold War framework. Another complicating reason in US relations with the Kurds was the long friendly relations of the Iraqi Kurds with the Iraqi Communist party (ICP) also the ostensibly natural communist-Kurdish coalition (Vis, 2014).

A program assistant in the Middle East Studies department at the Council on Foreign Relations James Prince stated that “the United States policy towards the Kurds in the Middle East was based on benign ignore and political containment”. This statement shows that the United States has had some responsibility to the Kurds; however history clearly contradicts this notion. It would be more perfect to show that the United States preferred to pursue foreign relation with officially recognized administrations of states in the Middle East without involving itself in the internal politics of these states (Moran, 1993).

Therefore, the US interests in the Kurdish issue are largely unrelated of the national movement of the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. Rather the Kurds and their quest for political autonomy are peripheral to the United States relationships with those nations which possess a significant Kurdish population. These relationships often have a significant political, military and academic dimension. To a considerable degree, U.S interests have also served as a counterpoint to the Soviet Union interests in the region. However, changed over time with the changes in the relationships between the United States and the governments of the nation involved. Moreover, the Soviet Union involvement with the Kurds has been generally, related to pursuit of border security and protection as well as enchantment of Soviet assists. In the wake of the Second World War, the U.S, primary concern in the Middle East region was containment of the Communists threat. This effort took the form of financial and military support to friendly nations to counter the Soviet influences. At this time, the dissatisfied and politically unsophisticated Kurds were easily subjected to Soviet influence, as they recognized that the relationships between their host governments and the United States were based on issue of mutual interests (Hawley, 1989).

Hence if one look at what the United States major policy interest were in relation to the Kurdish issue in Iraq during the Qassim’s administration, it appears there were not many at all. One of the complex reasons for backing up the Iraqi Kurds was the fact that two main US allies in the Middle East, Iran and Turkey might become destabilized if their considerable Kurdish minorities would further be inspired to ignite Kurdish nationalist

activities. The benefits of weakening the Qassim government with a Kurdish movement, did not outweigh the costs of perhaps also spoiling relations with two strategically very important allies for US, if a US sponsored Kurdish movement could not be kept on within Iraqi borders.

However, Iran did attempt to somehow exploit and shore up Kurdish movement in Iraq in spite of its risks. Many Iranian officials wished to replace Qassim since they had lost a Baghdad Pact ally, afraid of Qassim's cooperation with the Iraqi communists and the KDP, also finally due to of territorial disputes with Iraqi government. Nonetheless, from the fall of 1958 the UK and USA officials started to warn Iran not to encourage Kurdish separatist activities against Iraqi government. Both states considered Kurdish movement was unfavorable, also most of all afraid of a Kurdish movement would move Qassim even close to the Soviet communist bloc(Vis, 2014).

Feasibly the largest obstacle for the United States prop up of the Kurdish movement for political autonomy in Iraq, were the close historic ties which the main Kurdish political party, the KDP and its leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, had with international communism. As prior showed that the United States major approach for defending its interest in the Middle East was basically built on two strategic aims. The first aim was protecting the oil producing states in the Middle East safely under the United States military protection and influence(Lambert, 1997).

So the US's NATO allies were assured of an appropriate. The second strategic aim was preventing the expansion of Communist influence in the Middle East and Iraq in particular. the United States prop up to the Kurdish movement which led under the leadership of the KDP, which was pro-Soviet, which originally had very close ties with the Iraqi communist party that had a leader Mustafa Barzani who had been in exile in the USSR for approximately 11 years or so, also whose political programme notified that the KDP was 'interested in Marxist-Leninist thoughts', might hence be contrary to one of its own primary approach aims for the Middle East. Mustafa Barzani even vainly attempted to obtain, material back up from the USSR in 1960s. After the ICP-KDP cooperation ended in August 1959, both parties immediate aims remained greatly the same, except for

the 'Kurdish political autonomy' issue. By supporting Barzani and his party KDP, the United States would hence be indirectly backing the expansion of Communist influence in the Middle East generally and Iraq particularly (Cooper, 2011; Vis, 2014).

Furthermore, the KDP had already declared in its 1953 agenda that it wished to nationalize the Iraqi oil industry. This industry was being controlled by Western oil compromise, hence Iraqi nationalization might not solely be contrary to Western business interests in Iraq, however, it might feasibly further endanger another main aim of the United States in the region. The central government in Baghdad had loyal relations with the USSR and its Warsaw agreement allies, and if Iraq's oil production would be nationalized, Baghdad might have more easily decide to conduct exporting its oil to one of these states instead of supplying NATO members.

As showed previously, the NSC 5820/1 report instructed Washington to keep on friendly relations with Qassim's administration on a complimentary basis in an endeavour to curb USSR influence. The NSC statement also declared that leadership groups should have supported that present the best chance of promoting United States aims in the Middle East. Nonetheless, it keeps on with 'avoid turning out to be identified with specific internal issues or individuals. Seek to discredit groups which promote pro-USSR considering'. Thus, the United States did not want to turn out to be involved in the Kurdish issue, nor could it back Barzani movement, since the US suspected he ties with Soviet. Although the United States wanted a new pro-Western-government in Iraq. There were no realistic alternatives to Qassim available. Any United States shore up to the Barzan's movement would further harm US diplomatic efforts to develop relations with Qassim's administration.

Another advice in the NSC statement related to the United States policy interest with the Iraqi Kurdish issue was to increase factions within Iraq that wanted loyal relations with the West, however, without turning out to be identified with political issues and specific individuals. However, if the KDP leader Barzani remained true to his Marxist- Leninist inspired party origins, it would highly doubtful whether long-term loyal relations with the West could be established. Taking into account the US's 1958 policy-change of

accommodating to Pan-Arab nationalism, it might certainly create much more sense for the US to discretely support the Baathist party, Arab nationalist and Nasserites. They were fiercely anti-Communist, willing to overthrow Qassim and had far better alter of triumph keeping on a military coup, as would be seen in their February 1963 toppling of Qassim from power (Cooper ,2011; Vis ,2014).

3. The Qassim Regime, the Kurdish Issue and the United States 1960-1963

In May 1960, the Eisenhower administration supported the Kurdish forces to fight against the Qassim administration for political autonomy. However, it stopped its supporting to the Kurdish forces in November 1960, since the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani efforts to receive support for his movement from the Soviet Union (Blum, 2003, 2006). On 10 September, the Iraqi government declared its offensive against the Kurds and bombardment Kurdish areas by airplanes. On 11 September 1961, the Kurdish revolution (which is known as a September revolution among the Kurds) in the semi-governor of Zakho under the leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani occurred. The Kurds picked up arms against the central government for the first time. After a while Barzani's party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had also joined the revolution. Similarly, the other Kurdish tribal leaders (Agha), Mustafa Barzani's main complains were about the Agrarian Reform Law (which the KDP lift-wing backed), further the intertribal fighting which Qassim stimulated. Barzani, after he had first attempted to get the USSR support in November 1960, further fruitlessly sought aid from the United States and the British. While the KDP lift-wing regarded the latter two as an 'arch imperialists'. In the meantime, the KDP's lift-wing major complaint was lack of Kurdish political autonomy. Hence there was certainly not a united Kurdish separatist movement at the start of the Kurdish revolution in September 1961(Barzani ,2002; Wermeli, 2002).

After one year of fighting the Kurdish revolution, Qassim had not created any progress at all. In the meantime, his armed forces was not eager to fight a guerilla war also Qassim had progressively turned out to be politically isolated (Donovan 1990). In the meantime, the KDP of Barzani approached the Iraqi Communist party for preparing a coup, however the Communists hesitated. Hence by December 1962, Kurdish movement representatives

started negotiations with Arab nationalists, Nasserites and the Baathist party. These parties wanted guarantees from the Kurdish leaders that the Kurds would not take advantages of a coup d'état. The Kurdish leaders complied, believing that it would obtain full Kurdish political autonomy as a reward eventually on 8th February 1963, Qassim was successfully overthrown in a bloody military coup d'état under the leadership of Abdul Salam Arif (Nagel, 1978; Tripp, 2002).

There was some discussion as to whether the United States were somehow involved in supporting the Barzani movement and his Kurdish allies. The Kurdish movement was able to fight sufficient guerilla war, however they needed aid to end the stalemate and force Qassim into negotiations or surrender. Thus, the Kurdish leaders began a propaganda operation aimed at the West. Kurdish representatives had already attempting to persuade United States and European officials since September 1961 to promote the Kurdish issue at the United Nations, to deliver material and military support, also convince Iran and Turkey to permit smuggling into Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdistan Democratic Party officials even told the US diplomat in the summer of 1962 that most Communists had been purged from the KDP and the rest might sooner or later follow. Nonetheless, the conversation ended with US policy toward Kurdish movement has not altered (Vis, 2014).

A September 11, 1962, US memorandum upon Iraq that that, " the United States considered that the Kurdish issue in Iraq is an internal matter which should be resolved internally. Our (US) government does not support Kurdish activities against the Iraqi government in any way and hopes an early peaceful resolution will be possible. Besides, any US comments on certain Kurdish constitutional wishes would be a violation of Iraq's sovereignty. Washington believed that the future of the Kurdish people was 'inseparably tied to the interests of the countries in which they reside', which refers to Turkey and Iran too. In the end, Kurdish efforts did not succeed altering US's policy. The Soviet Union also did not want to break with Qassim and kept on its supply arms to the regime. The USSR supported to the Kurdish movement only consisted of some minor financial contributions,

also there is no evidence that the USSR delivered any significant weapons help to the Barzani's movement(Vis, 2014).

Till today, there is some disagreement among scholars about whether the United States clandestinely delivered some sort of support to the Kurdish movement. Little recommends that the US was somehow involved in the Kurdish movement. although little accurately showed that there were some US intelligence contacts with the Kurdish leader Barzani, and that Qassim suspected US involvement, he keeps on his argument that despite the CIA was considering extreme measure to obtain regime change in Iraq', it ultimately preferred 'political action rather than assassination'. Until now, Little does not show any evidence that would link direct CIA involvement to the emergence of the Kurdish movement, little even illustrated himself that there is no evidence that the Kennedy administration was somehow involved also only shows some quotes from an April 1962 CIA report that merely predicted correctly that Barzani might have become a great problem for Qassim's government that year(Little, 2010). As a result, the researcher agree with Gisbson and Vis that there is no substantial evidence to support Little's claim that the United States played a role in encouraging the outbreak of, or providing support to the Kurdish movement against the Qassim's regime in 1961(Gibson, 2013; Vis, 2014). However, needless to say that the Soviet United was supporting the Kurdish movement at that time.

Further Vis shows that the Kurdish movement of 1961 in Iraq 'might have obtained some backing'. Unfortunately, he also fails to show any document that may prove this, however Mufti recommends that the Kurdish movement may be related to Qassim's failed efforts to annex Kuwait in June 1961(Vis, 2014). Nevertheless, according to Rubin neither the US nor the United Kingdom (UK) provided any materials of political to the Kurdish (Rubin, 2007). A historian McDowall does recall how Barzani approached the US and the UK for help, however further creates no statements on any US involvement in Kurdish movement whatsoever (Mcdowall, 2004). Since the fact that none of these scholars that recommended feasible US involvement in the Kurdish movement can back this up with the reliable evidence; nor at present any disclosed US official evidence appear to exist

that would show direct support to the Kurdish movement. While other official US government evidences show that the Kurdish issue is an internal Iraqi affairs which does not concern the United States, it seems very unlikely that any important US covert shore up to the Kurdish movement took place.

Fascinatingly, a May 1962, US memorandum upon contingencies in Iraq recommended that if the Iraqi Kurds, in case of Qassim's overthrow, might reject to back up a new Iraqi administration and create claims for political autonomy, this might have no influence upon Washington's recognition of the new government. In this way the US would not be accused of backing up the Kurdish issue. This recommends that US officials were seriously focusing to keep on their course of non-involvement with the Iraqi Kurdish movement, if Qassim were to be overthrown. Besides, this further informs any prior covert US involvement in the Kurdish movement even more unlikely (Vis, 2014). Hence, the researcher agree with the scholars Pelletiere and Rubin that 'there is no convincing document that the United States meddled in this first movement of Barzani', also that even if some form of support took place, it is certain no advance weapons were delivered (Pelletiere, 1984; Rubin, 2007).

4. The First Baathist Regime, the Kurdish Issue and the United States 1963 - 1967

On 8th February 1963, in the bloody military coup d'état, which led by Abdul Salam Arif with the US and British intelligences support overthrown Abdul Karim Qassim from power. The US and British supported the Baathist leader Abdul Salam due to Qassim moved Iraq into the Soviet communist bloc. They afraid the communist would take control over Iraq. In the aftermath of the coup d'état plenty of Qassim's supporters, and most of all scores of Iraqi communist, were murder by the Baathist (Karol, 2009; Sorby, 2013).

In the White House the government change in Iraq was widely welcomed since its complicated relations with Qassim. The United States officials expected that Iraqi-US diplomatic relations would be considerably developed with this new administration also that the internal circumstance of Iraq might advantage too. On the other side, in spite of

the fact that USSR was obviously not delighted with losing Qassim's government further the subsequent crackdown upon Iraqi communists, it attempted to maintain as much influence in Iraq as feasible. Thus, the United States endeavour to exploit government change and develop its place in Iraq would not be unhampered. It moreover did not take so long before the Kurdish issue might complicate US's relations with the first Baathist administration. Mullah Mustafa Barzani soon set up demanding Baghdad for Kurdish political autonomy as a reward for Kurdish role in destabilizing Qassim's administration (Gibson, 2013).

In March 1963, the State Department evidence showed the official United States policy guidelines or handling with Iraq's new administration. The evidence established that if the new Iraqi administration should fail to acquire a swift political resolution to the Kurdish problem, which the only advantages would be the Iraqi communist and Soviet Union (Caruana, 2010). Nonetheless the US official place still remained that the Kurdish issue should be strictly regarded as an 'internal issue of Iraq'. The United States might have no direct or indirect role in resolving the Kurdish political autonomy issue, however, did want a peaceful compromise. The US further had to use its influence on Turkey and Iran to obtain 'a like hands-off policy' from their respective governments and objective for loyal Iraqi relations with its neighbouring states. Since the new administrations were anti-communist, it was expected that Iraq would follow a more non-aligned course and hence effectively decrease USSR communist influence. Thus, there was no need for the United States to instruct Iraq upon how to manage with its internal issue and communists (Vis, 2014).

In April 1963, the US national intelligence estimate called 'the Soviet Union Role in the Arab world', correctly showed US's assessment of the Soviet's role during the first Iraqi Baathist administration of 1963. During the Qassim's prime term, the USSR had handled to promote their influence in Iraq importantly through providing USSR advanced weaponry also many economic aid projects. Furthermore, Qassim created use of the influential also well-organized Iraqi communist while his administration's foreign policy was strongly.

In May 1963, the United States diplomats had already warned the new Baathist government that unless they began serious negotiations with the Kurdish leader Barzani, the guerilla war in Kurdistan of Iraq would resume with the Kurds now feasibly start backed through the USSR. Correspondingly to USSR's line, but the first Baathist government proved to be a main setback for USSR in the Middle East and Iraq. The first Baathist administration was extremely hostile towards the Iraqi communist party, particularly due to they had assisted Qassim in cracking down upon Nasserites and Baathist.

During 1963, the first Baathist regime succeeded in sufficiently cutting out the Iraqi communist party through assassinating prominent party leaders. The chances of a successful communist grab for power in Iraq were hence severely decreased, while the first Baathist administration further attempted to reduce Iraq's reliance on the USSR and its allies in the region. As a result, Baghdad sought Western technical, financial assistance and even wished Western advance arms(Gibson, 2013).

The United States believed that the USSR might have thought that they were just about to take Iraqi into the USSR orbit; hence they were extremely disenchanted about the present course of events. The United States now afraid of that the USSR would try to regain their influence in Iraq through attempting to sabotage Baathist efforts to obtain any compromise with the Kurdish leaders. If Moscow might succeed, US believed that the USSR would endeavour to regain lost ground by backing up a renewed Kurdish movement. Meanwhile, with the first Baathist regime in power in Baghdad, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq now all had anti-communist administrations which manifested once again and Arab desire for unity. Therefore, through 1963, US believed that a feasible Arab political union could actually be an extra obstacle for communist infiltration in the Middle East (Vis, 2014).

When in April 1963, Barzani requested the US aid for the Kurdish movement; the United States officials responded that the movement was considered an internal Iraqi issue and that the United States would not support them. However, when the Kurdish representatives negotiations with the first Baathist administration failed the United States

would not afford to remain out of the fighting could have on the entire region, the United States officials attempted to convince both Kurds and Iraqi government that a mutual compromise on Kurdish demands for political autonomy was the best resolution. Formally, the United States policy regarding the Kurdish issue in Iraq remained unchanged (Caruana, 2010). However, the United States diplomats stated in informal contacts that there were many upsides for the Kurds in remaining an integral part of the Iraqi country, also in signing a workable compromise. The Baghdad government further informally stated through the US to be 'forthcoming in meeting Kurdish aspirations to a reasonable autonomy degree'(Gibson, 2013).

Eventually, the United States vainly attempted to arrange an arrangement between the first Baathist government and the Kurdish leaders through offering surplus wheat from the United States Food for Peace Program. Nonetheless, in the end the United States diplomats' efforts could not have prevented a resumption of the Kurdish movement hostilities in June 1963. In the summer 1963, the first Baathist administration notified to be willing to help in liberating Palestine and kept on to buy the USSR advance arms. Despite the fact that these moves were opposite to US interests, the United States still turned down Kurdish appeal in July 1963 for US help for their movement. On the other hand, according to a memorandum from 10 July 1963, the United States had just agreed to sell US advance arms to Iraq also the evidence keeps with we are giving Iraqi some ammo for Kurds operation. Thus, are Syria and UAR obviously, eventually, the Iraqi armed forces offensive was so triumph that through the end of September United States intelligence expected that unless the Kurds would obtain any outside aid, their movement would feasibly collapse (Vis ,2014).

In the meantime, the USSR-Iraqi diplomatic relations deteriorated even moreover owing to the fact that the Soviet backed a failed endeavour to bring the Kurdish issue to the attention of the United Nations by its ally Magnolia. On 15 June 1963, the USSR announced in an official statement that Soviet backed up the Kurdish demands for political autonomy within the Iraqi republic and that Iraq's Kurdish policy violated the UN charter. Nonetheless, the added assertion that the first Baathist administration policies

might enable a restoration of Western dominance of Iraq that might be used against the security of the USSR state', discovered Moscow's basic concerns (Al-Bamarni, 2008).

In August 1963, the US wanted in long run that the Kurds would be assimilated within Iraq with a definite amount of local autonomous state in fundamentally Kurdish areas. A prolonged Iraqi Kurdish-Iraqi conflict would generate instability for neighbouring countries too, further U.S officials feared that the USSR might exploit the Kurdish issue in Iraq to promote its influence in the Middle East as a whole. With the aim of obtaining an early end to the war, the United States supposed that a strong Iraqi military attitude combined with an Iraqi readiness to take account legitimate Kurdish complaints was the best option. As a consequently, the United States administration was instructed to comply with rational Iraq requests for military equipment. The United States influence that might hence be gained should then be used to advocate Iraqi moderation in the Kurdish movement (Hunnicutt ,2011).

Indeed, briefly after the first Baathist administration came to power in Iraq, the United States had already set up supposed advance arms to Baghdad. As soon as rapidly, the anti-communist nature of Iraqi government had been confirmed, United States policy was directed at consolidating its place while loyal relations between US and Iraq allies in the Middle East had to be persuaded. Principally, the United States wanted the Kurdish movement to work out an agreement with the first Baathist government. If such an agreement would not suffice, US interests might be better served if the new Baathist administration would somehow control the Kurds. This might be much more preferable than an ongoing Kurdish movement that could lead to USSR or Iranian interference.

Eventually the first Baathist administration did not triumph completely defeating the Kurdish movement. On 18th November 1963, Baghdad was challenged with hitherto another military coup d'état, also once again Abdul Salam Arif was involved, however, this time helped through a coalition of anti-Baathist military officer. Arif immediately proclaimed his own eagerness to end the war. Owing to the toughness terrain in Kurdistan and Kurdish Peshmargas (those who face death) tactics, it was very hard to deliver the

last blow to the Kurdish movement. In addition, the Iraqi forces had been extremely weakened due to the prior coup d'état and purges (Stansfield ,2003).

Abdul Salam Arif eventually succeeded in arranging a ceasefire that was concluded on 10 February 1964. Interestingly, Barzani signed a ceasefire since he wanted to solve their differences peacefully. His Peshmargas had no advance weapons and were unable to Iraqi army. However, Vis shows that Barzani claimed afterwards the he signed the ceasefire at the behest of Washington, due to alleged Abdul Salam Arif's regime would be a good 'political pawns' to increase regional US objectives. Inappropriately, Barzani had no left behind any written and recorder verbal communication with the United States Ambassador or officials to prove this, since contacts were maintained through using third parties. The 10 February ceasefire was indeed a tactical move that provided both parties with a break with the aim of regrouping and consolidating their respective places. The ceasefire might hence be solely temporary and finally, after multiple armed confrontations in the winter of 1964 and 1965, the war would be restarted in April 1965 (Disney, 1980).

The United States needed eagerness to go to gigantic lengths in mediating between the Kurdish movement and Baghdad might further be showed through its officials US policy for the Middle East, introduced in April 1964. This approach announced that the White House attempts to set up its relations with the Middle Eastern countries upon a strictly bilateral basis and that the White House endeavours to avoid being sucked into war that are either in an inter-Arab or an Arab Israel framework, ' expect where key US wellbeing are affected'. Although Iran was politically speaking not an Arab country but Persian, this US attitude does of course further related to Iran. As a result, since the significant Israeli and Iranian key role in the Kurdish-Iraqi war from 1964 onwards, the White House feasibly might have been less inclined to interference. Besides, in the event of Kurdish unrest in Iran, the US might regard this, just like in the case of Iraq, as an internal matter(Caruana ,2010).

During 1964, the US changed its position of neutrality to one more sympathetic to Arif's administration. Even though, Abdul Salam Arif agreed to have negotiation with Mustafa

Barzani about feasible Kurdish political autonomy demands, no further progress on the issue was made so discussions finally collapsed in June 1964. Once again the Iraqi Kurds immediately requested United States backed up to the Kurdish rebellion, however, without triumph. Nonetheless, before the Kurdish-Iraqi hostilities restarted, US did become diplomatically involved again in attempting to resolve the Kurdish issue, in spite of its official non-involvement policy(Dawoody ,2006).

In these diplomatic contacts, the United States Ambassador Strong in Iraq informed both parties that the United States wished for a peaceful negotiated agreement within the context of the Iraqi country that might be obtained without foreign interference. He further showed that the Kurds should cooperate in attempting to receive an agreement since they had nothing to lose, should be patient during complex negotiation, and also be willing to 'compromise their extreme demands'. Furthermore, the United States thought that the Kurdish movement for political autonomy could be seriously harmed if it seemed as if they were acting as agents of foreign powers, hence the Kurds were instructed to escape turning out to be entangled in the interest of the external players.

There was in fact serious risk that the Kurds in Iraq may be used through Iraq's enemies for their own wellbeing. Israel for instance began providing gigantic scale help to the Iraqi Kurds shortly after general Qassim's administration had cracked down in 1963. The Israeli wished that if the Kurdish movement might resume, this might keep the Iraqi forces dogged down thereby thwarting that. Salam Arif might send a considerable Iraqi forces contribution during a new Israel-Arab war. Hence, through mid-1960s, Israel was providing the Kurds of Iraq with extensive help due to of its strong strategic wellbeing in weakening one of its plenty of Arab enemies(Vis, 2014).

The Iraqi Kurdish movement was further backed by the Iranian Shah's regime. Iran perceived Iraqi nationalism as a threat to Iran, particularly since Salam Arif's administration maintained close relations with the Shah's regional competitor Nasser. Next to this, the Shah of Iran wanted to regain full access over the Shatt-Al-Arab at the Iran-Iraqi border. The Shah's regime regarded the Kurdish movement as a key for his operation to destabilize Iraqi military administration. While a ceasefire was just about to

be signed in 1964, the Shah of Iran began delivering massive amounts of advance weapons to the Kurdish movement(Gibson ,2013).

According to Little both Iran and Israel were persuaded through the CIA to back up the Kurdish movement in Iraqi Kurdistan from 1964 onwards. Nonetheless, the US State Department evidence shows that Iranian and Israel back up to the Kurdish movement was, especially at that time, contrary to the United States interests. Little fails to show any evidence that proof that the US supported the Kurdish movement through these third parties since allegedly the CIA motivated them to do so, nor did he illustrated US purposes (Little, 2010). According to Alvandi, little mixed up Iranian and Israeli back to the Kurdish movement that had begun at the beginning of the 1960s, in line ‘with periphery pact between both states, with indirect, interference in Kurdistan’. Subsequently Alvandi further claims that the available document stated that US was troubled about Israeli and Iranian efforts to destabilize Iraq that consequence in even more Iraqi contingency upon the USSR and hence promoted Communist influence. Indeed, the United States administration had little influence on Israel or Iranian policy regarding the Kurdish issue at all. As a result, Tehran’s and Tel-Aviv’s backed up to the Kurdish movement during the 1960s could not feasibly be discovered as directed interference in Iraqi as little showed (Alvandi, 2011).

Nonetheless, one cannot fully exclude the feasibility that the CIA might have been conducting clandestine in involving the Kurdish movement in Iraq, without informing the States Department, Alvandi claims that ‘no evidence has yet emerged to shore up this argument’(Alvandi, 2011). Gibson and Vis agrees with Alvandi that Little’s claim about the CIA persuaded Iranian shah and Israel to support the Kurdish movement cannot be proven. Basically because ‘there is no document to prop up this conclusion’, Gibson even suggests that the United States had not sent any aid, nor had it persuaded the Kurds in Iraq to revolt against successive Iraqi government, before 1972. Therefore, there is presently no document available that would recommend that the United States clandestinely persuaded the Kurdish movement in Ira, nor any sources that might show US encouragement for Iran or Israel to back or stir up the Kurdish movement. It appears

that rather implausible, particularly since the State Department documents showed such aid to be contrary to the United States wellbeing also since the fact that the US officials were advising the Kurdish leader in Iraq by December 1964 not to listen to the Iranian and Israeli who persuaded the Kurds to restart the movement(Gibson, 2013; Vis, 2014).

The United States shared Iraqi administration's concern, which the Kurdish autonomy movement might be used by the USSR as political pawns to infiltrate the Middle East. Ultimately, in August 1965, the United States further obtain Iraqi administration request to back up their efforts to suppress the Shah of Iran aid to the Kurdish movement in Iraq. the United States complied and American government remained consistent in declaring that the Kurdish movement was internal Iraqi issue, hence Iranian shore up to the Kurds violated this principal also was incompatible with US's objectives of area stability. Since Iraq's knowledge of the extent of the Iranian government prop up, US feared Iranian-Iraqi relations might deteriorate even faster. As a result, the US had to intervene through expressing their concerns to Iran over Iraqi annoyance, moreover towards the United States, due to Iranian shore up to the Kurdish movement. Hence Iranian policy might harm US Iraqi diplomatic relations, further Iran's wellbeing. The United States position towards Iraq was moreover complex through the fact that plenty of Iraqi officials actually supposed that the US was capable of creating the Shah alter his attitude upon the Kurds in Iraq that absolutely was not the case (Gibson, 2013).

In the autumn 1965, a detailed US investigation of the Kurdish issue in Iraq was showed. The investigation had as its central conclusion that a gigantic amount of political autonomy or even independence for the Kurds in Iraq might upset the stability of the entire region, most significantly affecting the United States loyal allies Turkey and Iran, further in the end might hence be contrary to the United States wellbeing. A dwindling Kurdish movement was seen as harmful for the United States interests too. Nonetheless, it appeared unlikely that the Iraqi communist or even the Soviet might exploit such a circumstance also take command of a main movement. A victory Kurdish endeavour to install an independent administration further appeared implausible, hence a main US interference was not deemed necessary (Disney, 1980; Pelletiere ,1991).

Although all for different factors, the US, the USSR and the UAR wanted a peaceful and negotiated arrangement. But Israel and Iran also feasibly the UK too, preferred a continuation of the Iraqi Kurdish movement owing to its destabilizing on the Arab state. The US position in Iraq would be harmed through Israeli and Iranian back up to the Kurdish movement, however, the United States administration supposed that neither state want conform to US wellbeing in this war. Since the United States officials regarded the Kurdish issue as long-term and one that could not be resolved through military campaign either side, the White House's policy on the issue remained that the Kurdish issue was an internal Iraqi issue which certainly only be resolved with a negotiated political arrangement (Lambert, 1997; Vis, 2014).

President Abdul Salam Arif had commenced a new Iraq armed forces operation in spring 1965. Nonetheless, another Iraqi operation in the winter of 1965 and 1966 was eventually ended owing to Abdul Salam Arif's sudden death in a helicopter crash in April 1966. He was succeeded by his brother Abdul Rahman Arif, however when the Iraqi armed forces suffered a crushing defeat against the Peshmarga in May 1966. On 29 June 1966, the Iraqi moderate Prime Minister Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz sent a 15 points offer for solving the Kurdish issue to Mullah Mustafa Barzani that the Kurdish leader approved on 30 June 1966. Furthermore, Al-Bazzaz signed a ceasefire with the Kurds, which might last for almost two year. But, in the end this Al-Bazzaz's declaration was never fulfilled (Al-Bamarni, 2008; Disney, 1980).

On 18 August 1966 when Naji Talib, the new Iraqi prime minister, met with US Ambassador Strong to discuss the Kurdish question, he declared that the GOI would implement Bazzaz's programme on Kurdish autonomy fully. However, he dwelt extensively on the difficulties that it presented and gave no hint on how the GOI would proceed towards its implementation. The most serious problem that he identified was the three-way split among the Kurds, with Barzani insisting that the GOI deal only with him; however, the GOI could neither ignore the Kurds who had sided with the GOI, nor those who had been members of the old KDP. Talib stated that Barzani wanted to be "King of Kurdistan", but beyond that nobody knew what his intentions were. Touching upon the

complications towards implementation of the peace programme once again, he emphasized the GOI's need for support against the Kurdish movement, since Iran had entered the fray with help for the Kurds. Talib took a very hard line, and when asked what Iraq wanted from Iran his response was that the GOI wanted good relations with it, but he wished the US would warn Iran to adhere to a hands-off policy vis-à-vis Iraq. Strong acknowledged that Iran was unlikely to heed US advice on the issue. On 5 October 1966, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adnan Pachachi, met with the US Secretary of State, Rusk, on the self-same issue and stated that, "Iraq had been able to solve the Kurdish issue. And it would be a gesture of great help if the US could aid reconstruction in Northern Iraq (Kurdish areas)". Pachachi expressed his desire that the US do something about Iranian assistance to the Kurds. Iran on its part denied these accusations and indicated that it had adopted a hands-off policy towards Iraq and continued to reject Kurdish requests for help.

Over and over again a deadlock had progressed by October 1966, and this situation essentially remained the same throughout 1967 and 1968. Essentially, Abdul Rahman Arif's administration could not defeat the Kurdish movement by force since it failed to prevent Iranian and Israeli aid from reaching the Kurdish movement. Eventually, the position of Abdul Rahman Arif's administration had ruthlessly been weakened through its fiasco to resolve the Kurdish issue and since of its damaged prestige after the Arab defeat in the Six Day war with Israel. This weakened was exploited through the Baathist left-wing and the Iraqi army under the leadership of Saddam Hussein and Ahmed Hassan Al-Baker conducted another successful coup d'état in July 1968, expelling Abdul Rahman Arif from power in Baghdad (Mcdowall&Short, 1996).

In November 1966, the United States attitude on Iraq was primarily constructed on attempting to form an effective Western presence in the state with the aim of limiting USSR influence as much as feasible. Despite the short-lived first Baathist administration, the Communist occurrence in Iraq still remained great however this time centered on official USSR mission in the state. Nonetheless, the United States was at the same time attempting, 'to offset USSR influence in the Kurdish region through maintaining a loyal

though accurate relationship with the major body of the Kurds', since the Iraqi Kurds constituted a considerable share of Iraq's population and inhabited a strategic part of the country such as Kirkuk and Mosul oil installations. The White House further encouraged policies designed to enhance nationalistic factions in Iraq that wished to avoid as well much reliance upon the USSR or the UAR. The Kurdish-US relation might practically remain limited to US's concern upon a strictly humanitarian basis for their movement.

When the United States obtained intelligence in September 1967 upon a feasible resumption of the Kurdish movement, this was seen as especially dangerous owing to the already tense circumstance in the Middle East so briefly after the June 1967 Six-Day war. Hence, the US was powerfully opposite to a resumed Kurdish movement and feared the outcome if Iranian and Israel backed up to the Kurdish movement would turn out to be public. Finally, Abdul Rahman Arif's administration severed its diplomatic relations with White House since the Six Day War (Vis, 2014).

5. The Kurdish Issue during the Nixon Administration 1970 -1973

After the Baathist left-wing had succeeded in their coup against Abdul Rahman Arif on 17 July 1968 (Devlin 1991). They started preparation for installing a new powerful Baathist government. Eventually, in April 1969, the new Baathist government declared another military campaign against the Kurdish movement. Successively, the Kurdish leaders threatened that if the United States was willing to give direct secret aid to the Kurds, Mustafa Barzani might attack on the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) oil installations. Nonetheless, the United States officials declined also recommended the Iraqi Kurds to lobby for Israeli and Iranian shore up, whose assistance was according to the Kurds inadequate (Mcdowall, 2004).

Finally, Mustafa Barzani had to approve a ceasefire and on 11 March 1970, the new Baathist administration issued a directive, the March Manifesto that outline Baghdad's new policy to accommodate Kurdish national right wishes(Mustafa, 2003). The most significant points included the recognition of Kurdish language as the official language in the Kurdish areas, also the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish nation being equal in

bi-national Iraq. In return, the Kurdish movement leaders had to resign their heavy arms and should officially recognize Baghdad's sovereignty over Kurdish region (Dawoody, 2006). However, as soon as this transitional agreement was signed, the Kurds had already begun looking for foreign shore up for another Kurdish movement. Eventually, the March Manifesto failed to define the geographic areas destined for the Kurdish autonomous region; also soon the war was restarted. First violence was limited, however when in the March of 1974 a massive Iraqi offensive against the Kurdish movement (Gibson, 2010).

Dissimilar the preceding the first Baathist administration, the new Baathist government headed through president Baker improved into one of the most fanatical anti-US administrations in the Middle East region (Yildiz&Blass, 2004). The Baathist thought profited from the extreme anti-USA sentiments in Ira and the Muslim World, since the United States backed up to Israel in the 1967 war. As a result of the 1967 war, plenty of Arab states, also Abdul Rahman Arif's Iraq had severed their diplomatic relations with America. Primarily, the US relations with the new Baathist administration in Iraq were further absolutely limited. Nonetheless, When the new Baathist administration endorsed on a fifteen-year USSR-Iraqi agreement of cooperation and friendship in April 1972, and the new Baathist government decided to nationalize Western-owned oil companies without providing any compensation, the Kurdish rebellion once again-required US's serious attention.

As a matter of fact, during Nixon first term presidency, United States policy toward Iraq was drastically altered. During its first years, the Nixon administration avoided Washington involvement in regional policies and chose to focus on the main US policy problems, as the opening of China, US disengagement from the Vietnam War, and acquiring detent with USSR. As a result, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf were not a first concern until the end of Nixon's first term. The Nixon administration was more supposed to let Iran manage with the regional crisis in the Gulf region also supported the Iranian Shah in his disagreement policy towards Iraq. Nonetheless, the Shah of Iran wanted more US involvement with the Baathist regime. Hence, Israel and Iran argued that the March Manifesto was a USSR project to promote Soviet's influence over Iraq.

However, the Nixon administration regarded their intelligence as manipulative, since the new Baathist regime had just commenced a repressive operation in March 1970 against communist cadres in Iraq (Dawoody, 2006).

In the end, United States' views on Iraq and the Middle East importantly altered owing to the new British military withdrawal from the Gulf in December 1971. The United States backed to the Kurdish movement from 1972 onwards further persuaded through this important alter in the geopolitical constellation of the Middle East and White House's altered policy towards the Middle East. Hostile states like Baathist Iraq, or feasibly even the Soviet itself, might profit from the succeeding power vacuum in the Middle East. Towards the end of the 1960s Syria, Iraq and Egypt already housed several thousand USSR military advisers. Moreover, US feared that the USSR might also attempt to install a strategic presence in the Middle East. The Nixon administration was also frustrated that Iraq had signed a clandestine arms deal with the USSR in November 1971, followed by an Iraqi halt of persecuting domestic communists. However, the critical juncture for US was certainly the signing of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty of cooperation and friendship in April 1972. In the White House's opinion, this treaty meant that Iraq had now sufficiently become a USSR ally in the Cold War challenge in the Middle East (Vis, 2014).

Nonetheless, the new Baathist government closer cooperation with the USSR in 1972 was pragmatic rather than ideological. The Baathist government primarily wanted USSR shore up constructing its forces army with advanced USSR arms. For the USSR the treaty meant that the USSR would receive more influence in the Middle East, that it gained a strategic access to the Persian Gulf, and that it could discuss a well position for domestic Communists in Iraq.

Since the Vietnam War, US forces resources were already stretched, hence the US was unable to take over the British security commitments in the Middle East. Hence, the Nixon administration had to rely upon the so-called Twin Pillar approach that meant Saudi Arabia and Iran would obtain considerable US shore up with the aim of functioning as regional bastions against communist expansion or Arab radicalism. In the meantime, the US sent the more powerful Iran with a bigger share of US shore up. This US attitude

of constructing Iran as a regional policeman was increased by the UK military withdrawal, also part of the Nixon Doctrine. This US attitude was declared in July 1972, and principally called on the US to shore up its regional allies in taking upon the main responsibility for their self-defense. Nixon wanted Iran to triumph to succeed the British as the main regional player to maintain stability in the area. In addition, Nixon relied on Iran to protect US interests in the Middle East and Persian Gulf as well (Vis, 2014).

In March 1972, however, the Israelis and Iranian started indicating US to take place in backing the Kurdish movement in Iraq, so the Baathist administration would not take upside of the power vacuum after the UK had withdrawn from the Middle East. They supposed that the USSR were deliberately constructing Baathist regime for that specific purpose, moreover, the USSR attempted to insure Mustafa Barzani to join a national front administration in Baghdad that when installed, might be a 'generally communist government'. The NSC supposed this progress might be of considerable geopolitical significance, due if the Kurdish movement might hence be suppress, the Iraqi army may be available for military political operations in the Middle East, feasibly aimed at Western oil wellbeing (Gibson, 2013).

Still the Nixon administration hesitated about backing the Kurdish movement in Iraq because of concerns about Barzani's connection with the USSR; doubts about the strength of the Kurdish movement, also the US assure that Israel and Iran were perfectly capable to shore up the Kurdish movement without US involvement. Principally, the US was opposed to any campaign that might endanger future opportunities for developing relations with the Baathist regime in Baghdad. Further, it was inconceivable that a Kurdish-led administration in Baghdad might succeed, it might be very tough to protect an US help campaign clandestine, if the United States shore up to the Kurdish movement might turn out to be known, relations with Arab allies could become absolutely damaged, also finally it may develop the chance of establishing a separate Kurdish states in that Middle East that would lead to moreover disintegration of an already unstable region (Caruana, 2010).

In the meantime, the US intelligence agency CIA was not eagerness about backing the Kurdish movement either. It supposed that the strangest of triumph toppling the Baathist administration through the Kurdish movement were thin. Furthermore, the CIA warned that US involvement in such a plan could be interpreted through the USSR as action directed against them. This might harm present US diplomatic efforts to achieve détente with Soviet. Since this broad opposition to US involvement in the Kurdish movement, the Nixon administration kept pursuing a non-interference policy (Gibson, 2013).

Hitherto, through the summer of 1972, the Nixon administration began a covert operation in Iraqi Kurdistan with the aim of preoccupation the Baathist government in Iraq. Hence, the USSR influence in the Middle East might further be restrained. This sudden US reaction shift was basically persuaded by the signing of the USSR-Iraqi treaty of cooperation and friendship in April 1972. The US aims of this a new reaction were turning Baghdad's radical administration military development in war, contemplated on the Kurdish movement, and preventing the USSR from obtaining its ambitions aims.

During a trip to Iran in May 1972, Nixon and Kissinger approved with the Shah something needed to be done about the close USSR-Iraqi diplomatic relationship. Already previously to this meeting Nixon had received a briefing paper from the NSC staff, which informed the Nixon administration of the massive risk that the present Baathist administration posed for regional stability and peace. It was acknowledged that the USSR would exert considerable influence since the Baghdad government was lack of their aid. This USSR influence might promote even more when Iraq's internal stability could be developed in combination with shared interests in Iraq's ambitions in the Middle East. On the other hand, this automatically also meant that a continuous country of internal instability in Iraq would be harmful for USSR interests (Lambert, 1997).

Furthermore, the shorting paper warned that the Iraqi government had the potential for distributing stability in the Gulf it might sufficiently use USSR back. Despite Baghdad had already received some 1 billion US dollars in communist forces help since 1958, the Iraqi armed forces had not been notably triumph in operating sophisticated arms, and had limited operation capabilities. Nonetheless, the US was frustrated due to certain new

developments. The Baathist government had negotiated the greatest USSR military and economic assurances that had ever been made to Iraq. Additionally, the USSR-Iraqi military collaboration was now officially implemented in the 1972 USS-Iraqi treaty, while USSR military training in sophisticated weapons systems kept on. The language in the USSR Iraqi treaty was further formulated in a way that may be enable USSR military facilities in Iraq harbors. The White House claimed that the Baathist administration because of USSR back had now been standing on ceremony in a treaty, would feel more powerful in the Middle East also act accordingly. Ultimately, since the massive quantity of oil revenues, the Baathist administration had already initiated in November 1971 a major expansion of its military, with large amounts of sophisticated and offensive weapons (Little, 2010).

When during their meeting in Iran Kissinger questioned for approach recommendation, the Shah of Iran responded that Iran ‘had to have the most modern advance arms, and then Iran could aid with the Kurds’. The shah also feared that if the Kurds would join a national unity administration, ‘the Kurdish question instead of being a thorn in the side could become an asset to the communists’, and that Iran could no longer use the Kurdish issue as a leverage against the Baathist administration.

On 31 May 1972, the State Department report so-called ‘the Kurds of Iraq renewed insurgency’, showed that “Mullah Mustafa Barzani would be able to attract effective prop up for a renewed Kurdish movement. Above and beyond, a long-dawn-out movement may be certainly bring down the already unpopular Baathist administration”(Dawoody, 2006). The National Security Council advisor Harold Saunders further warned Kissinger that even though the gigantic achievement for the Kurds might be preservation of Kurdistan autonomous region, if the Kurds would fail the US. Would neither have the means nor the interests to provided conclusive support. It was moreover unlikely that the Kurds could have real influence on the character of successor regime. However, on the bright side, Iraqi relations with the USSR could become terrified, also the controversial Iraqi-Soviet treaty ‘may become a dead latter’(Vis, 2014).

In the end, the Nixon administration had plenty of factors for shoring up the Kurdish movement after the Iraqi-Soviet treaty was signed, also which were now deemed more significant than the feasible risks. Eventually, Nixon's decision to set up backing up the Kurdish movement was feasibly persuaded by a combination of White House's concern about the increasing significance of Iraq as a strategic ally to the USSR after the British withdrawal from the Middle East, and appeasing the Shah's desire to become the main power in the Persian Gulf that further had to prevent spread of USSR influence. Other factor that contributed to Nixon's administration approval of the Kurdish movement were White House concerns about Baghdad's nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in June 1972, the fact that Iraq had become even more significant to the Soviet since the Soviet personnel was kicked out from Egypt in July 1972 by Egypt president Anwar Sadat, plans from the Baathist regime to legalize the Iraqi Petroleum Company and bring to a government coalition. And finally a realization that the Iraqi Kurds could be used as leverage to weakened the USSR-friendly Iraqi government(Nehme&Meho ,1995).

The National Security Adviser Kissinger afraid of the Iraqi-Soviet partnership might further enable the USSR to strength its position toward Iran, while it could additionally persuade Iraqi to threaten its neighbours. Nonetheless, US backed up the Kurdish movement could outcome in constant enforce on Baghdad, hence the Baathist regime would be entangled in domestic issues. Hence, the United States shore up to the Iraqi Kurdish movement was not simply about curbing USSR influence, however, also about sabotaging the Baathist government.

Already previously to Kissinger's decision to a clandestine aid to the Kurdish movement, serious risks also issue for the Kurdish military offensives were identified. Feasibly, the most significant one was that direct USSR interference might not be excluded, since they had invested so much in their position in Iraq. This could further feasibly lead to an even stronger USSR occurrence. Another issue was Turkish concern of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism spreading to its own territory. Into the bargain there was the problem of Kurdish factionalism. Further troublesome was the fact that the State Department wished to open a United Sates Interest Section (USIS) in Baghdad in fall 1972, a progress that

feasibly had to be cancelled if US shore up to the Kurdish movement might become known (Gibson, 2013).

Another problem was the fact that US shore up should be limited to such an extent that plausible denial was still feasible. Besides, the United States prop up had to be coordinated with their parties, the Iranian and Israelis also the Kurds that entailed even more security issues. Meaningfully, in this whole campaign Iran and Israel were essential as an intermediary in delivering US financial and military weapons since its geographical location. Nonetheless, already in 1972, the Shah of Iran had a reputation as an unreliable and ambitions ruler, who could eventually decide to sacrifice the Iraqi Kurds (Shareef, 2010).

The director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms sent a detailed proposal on the US shore up to the Kurdish movement for Nixon administration in a memorandum on 18 July 1972, which showed that ‘ the threat to moderate Middle Eastern administrations also to western interests posed through the USSR-supported Iraqi Baathist government warrants helping Barzani maintain his opposition to that government. It was very crucial that, ‘to see the Baathist administration in Iraq kept off balance or escalating hostilities to a dangerous international level’. Ultimately, the Cold War argumentation in Helm’s proposal motivated Nixon and Kissinger to approve his plans on 31 July 1972.

With the aim of fighting a defensive operation, it was estimated that the Kurds might need 18 million US dollars per year. The Nixon administration would deliver one-sixth of those amounts in advance arms and cash, while the Shah of Iran would have to pay 9 million US dollars. The declassified document which contains this particular assistance proposal did not reveal who would pay the other 6 million US dollars to the Kurdish movement, however this specific details has feasibly been unclear. However, it appears feasibly Israel had been the third party financially involved since the Israelis, in cooperation with the Iranians, were already closely involved in shoring up the Kurdish movement since the 1966 (Vis, 2014).

The eventual objective of US and Iranian Shah propping up was not to immediately depose the Baathist regime in Iraq, nor was it to enable the Kurdish forces to form a Kurdistan autonomous region in Iraq as Barzani by that time wanted. The United States allies Turkey, and Iran vehemently opposed such Kurdish region. Its objective was in fact to provide Barzani with the minimum amount of shore up needed to preserve the Kurdish movement as a defensive forces army, capable of restraining the Baathist administration also prevent aggressive Iraq adventures in the region. The US aid was intended to keep on Kurdish movement at which they excelled, since a massive Kurdish forces offensive may lead to immediate interference from the USSR. Moreover, the largest amount of US support necessary for such a Kurdish offensive could never be kept clandestine.

Hence primarily, the United States policy on supporting the Kurdish issue was devised at obtaining a scenario in which the Kurds would not be defeated, however, in which they were not believed to win either. Furthermore, the CIA supposed that the Kurdish forces ability to resist Baghdad was feasibly their simply chance to sabotage the Baathist administration and may contribute; to its replacement by elements less hostile our interests'. Besides, according to Kissinger it was the Nixon administration's by and large strategy to weaken any country that close relations with the Soviet. As a result, in the case of Iraq the Nixon administration was very susceptible to shoring up the Kurdish issue (Gibson, 2013).

As a consequence of the United States, Iranian-Israel prop up, Barzani was ultimately capable to force two-thirds of Iraq's army to be stationed near Kurdish areas, hence alarming Baghdad's ability to conduct destabilizing campaigns in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Iraq succeeded in extracting even more military hardware from its USSR allies since the threat of a full scale Kurdish movement. Besides in September 1973, US intelligence pressed that practically all of the Baathist opponents, simply the Kurds excluded had been neutralized. US's wished of contributing to the Baathist administration's replacement through other domestic parties was now useless (Cooper ,2011).

Primarily, from the onset of the covert Kurdish movement offensive in July 1972, this 'no win- no lose policy' determined US policy upon the Kurdish issue for the following three years. Nonetheless, the first year of the offensive till the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, was somewhat of an exception. During this year, US policy toward Iraq was essentially bifurcated due it followed two different and incompatible tracks. The US went ahead with its policy of promoting friendly US-Iraq relations also its plans to form an interest section in Baghdad in fall 1972. This conflicted with the Washington's policy sabotage the Baathist administration. Nonetheless, in spring 1973 and particularly after the October War, Kissinger ultimately authorized a major increase in US assistance to the Kurds, hence running chances for developing US Iraqi-relations. As a result, the Washington's policy of sabotaging the Baathist administration prevailed (Vis 2014).

As tension in Iraq progressed, the White House's shore up to the Kurdish movement was promoted in March 1973 to five million US dollars a year, while the Iranians augmented their help to thirty million US dollars. Kissinger's motivation was that Iraq had turned out to be the most key client of Soviet in the Middle East, that the Baathist administration was funding terrorist organizations and that it was the main power behind Arab endeavours to block Israeli-Arab peace initiatives primarily, through increasing shore up to the Kurdish movement while warning Barzani not to set up a military operation, Kissinger attempted to control over the Iraqi Kurds just like the Shah did (Disney, 1980).

In the meantime, during 1973-1974, the White House rejected two separate proposal for Barzani to alter its tactics from defensive to offensive operations. In October 1973, Kissinger claimed Barzani not to initiate a main offensive against the Iraqi forces. The Kurdish leader was incited to do so through the Israeli, who were entangled in the You Kippur War and wanted to prevent Iraq from sending more forces to the Syrian front. According to Meho and Nehme 'Kissinger showed how United States interests would suffer if the Kurds would gain the upper hand over the Iraqis forces', also subsequently ordered the CIA to urge the Kurds not to take any offensive activities(Meho& Nehme, 2003). However, Gibson's showed for this US advice, that the Kurdish movement were not sufficiently equipped for such a campaign creating a Kurdish operation 'suicidal',

appears much more plausible. Besides, according to Gibson, Kissinger afraid of such an offensive would further lead massive retaliation from Baghdad (Gibson, 2013).

It is uncertain why Meho and Nehme would assume that poorly armed Kurdish movement, simply trained in guerrilla warfare, would possibly defeat the heavily USSR equipped Iraqi forces in a conventional war, let alone why Kissinger would have supposed this. Moreover, Iraq had sent only one battalion to the Syrian border, hence the massive majority of the Iraqi forces were still deployed at the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. Meho and Nehme also fail to show any primary sources that would confirm that that Kissinger thought that the Kurds would be able to gain the upper hand in a military war with Baghdad, nor do they showed why this would be harmful for US interests.

Nonetheless, according to Vis and Gibson, Kissinger did instruct the US Ambassador to Iran to consult with the Shah, who approved that the Israeli proposal was suicidal. Kissinger felt the same and subsequently informed Barzani that a Kurdish military attack was not advisable. Hence, Gibson and Vis showed of US advice for Barzani against operation military activities appears much more credible. Furthermore, in 1974, Kissinger further talked Barzani out of attacking Iraqi oil installation owing to the White House feared that this would intensify international concerns about sufficient access to energy resources ((Meho& Nehme, 2003).

Especially the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 appears to have supposed Kissinger of the significance of the Kurdish issue, since he supposed that their presence had prevented Baghdad from sending a considerably larger military contribution to the Syrian front. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, Egypt's president Sadat and Kissinger came up with a plan in which Iran would stir up trouble in Kurdistan of Iraq in the winter of 1973-74, hence Iraq might withdraw its forces from Syria. This plan was ultimately successfully fulfilled, outcome in Iranian-Iraqi tensions in February 1974. When the Israelis informed Kissinger in March 1974 that the Kurds needed more aid, the latter's responded revealed this true intentions, that is securing Arab Israeli disagreement: 'You can tell them we have already taken action since it is in our interest to keep the Iraqis distracted while we are working on the Syrian'. Even though this policy of inciting

the Kurds aid Kissinger in convincing Israeli to pull back its troops from Syria as well, this plan further contributed to the resurgence of the Kurdish fighting. Fascinatingly, the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir informed Kissinger in May 1974 that Soviet's position upon the Kurdish-Iraqi war had altered. The USSR had always attempted to remain an intermediary. Nonetheless, in 1974, the USSR appeared to have decided to give their full support to the Baathist government (Cooper, 2011; Lambert, 1997).

6. The Kurdish Issue during the Ford Administration 1974 - 1975

On 11 March 1974, the Ba'athist government declared its own new offers of Self-government Law and gave Barzani two weeks to approve and enter the National Front (Stansfield 2006). Ultimately, Barzani rejected to approve this law, since the CIA assured him the US would support his movement logistically. He was wishing that with the promised support from the U.S, Iran and Israel he could exchange a better autonomy deal or even independence for the Kurds. Long afterwards, Mullah Mustafa stated that: 'Without United States promises we would not have acted the way we did.' On the other hand, in 1974 Barzani hadn't grasped hitherto that neither Iran nor the U.S. truly wanted Kurdish self-government (Yildiz&Blass, 2004).

The Iraqi- Kurdish violence increased suggestively after Barzani's refusal of the Self-government Law. Hence the new United States President Gerald Ford accepted an arrangement during the summer of 1974 whereby Israel delivered the Kurdish movement with twenty-eight million U.S. dollars in captured Soviet advance weapons in exchange for the US financial compensation. This was on top of the other weaponry backing up (Vis ,2014).

Nonetheless, during the winter of 1974-1975 the Kurdish movement condition had become so frantic that Iran would have to create a major troop commitment into Iraqi territory with the purpose of sustaining Kurdish movement, something the Shah of Iran ultimately degenerated. In spite of the fact that U.S. Ambassador Helms lobbied comprehensively in Iran to keep on the Israeli-Iranian-U.S. mission of clandestinely supporting the Kurdish movement, the Shah of Iran could not be convinced and on 19

February 1975 Kissinger informed President Ford that the Iranian shah had plans to meet with Iraq's Vice-President, Saddam Hussein, undoubtedly for negotiations on resolving the Kurdish question. The next day Kissinger sent a reassuring message to Mullah Mustafa Barzani, without declaring the Iranian Shah's strategies of cutting an agreement with Baghdad (Korn, 1994).

Ultimately, on 5 March 1975, during the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Conference in Algeria, Saddam Hussein and the Shah signed the Algiers-Accord which granted Iran favorable resolution of border disagreements at the Shatt-al-Arab waterway in exchange for Iran discontinuing its shore up to the Kurdish movement. Kissinger was profoundly irritated over the Iranian Shah's decision to abandon the Kurds (Korn, 1994). Kissinger supposed that the Algiers-Accord would allow a fundamental pro-Soviet government and would empower Iraqi communists to consolidate their effect, which would aggravate White House's Cold War policy in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf as well. On the other hand, the Ford administration was not prepared to make a much greater assurance to the Kurdish movement, of which Kissinger discovered that it would cost the Ford administration between 300 and 500 million U.S. dollars yearly, while the practicability of such a maneuver was very indefinite. Consequently, in March 1975, both the U.S. and the Israelis governments decided to limit the damage and ceased their support to the Kurdish rebels.

There is some arguments among experts about whether the United States. Consciously sold out the Kurdish question or whether they had no choice in ending their prop up. The principal disagreement is the Ford administration abandoned Mustafa Barzani without cautioning, ignored desperate Kurdish appeals for shoring up, and unsuccessful to deliver humanitarian aid after the Kurdish movement was finally cracked down. The foremost backer of this opinion is Representative Otis Pike, who was the chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence agency, a congressional investigation into the CIA operations and their costs. Leaking to the press of the conclusions from the so-called Pike Report in February 1976 finally discovered the details of the Kurdish movement operation (Vis, 2014).

According to the Pike Committee, documents recommended that ‘the mission was initiated principally as a favour to our ally [Iran]’. U.S. support could moreover be seen as ‘greatly symbolic’, since Iran’s shore up was meaningfully larger. Conversely, it was similarly established that “the U.S. acted in effect as a sponsor that the insurgent group would not be instantly dropped by the foreign head of state. Still, the U.S was incapable to thwart the Shah from abruptly cutting off his aid to the Kurds. The Pike Committee articulated that if the U.S. had not backed Iran’s pushing of the Iraqi Kurds, ultimately the movement might have reached an agreement with the Baathist government in Baghdad over some form of political autonomy.

Additionally, the high quantity of clandestineness surrounding the campaign was because of the State Department, powerfully opposite to such meddling in the Middle East, was not believed to be knowledgeable. On the ‘no win, no lose’ approach of U.S. policy the Pike Report said: ‘Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise.’ The Pike Committee also acknowledged that as a result of all U.S. shore up was channeled through Iranian government; direct aid to the Kurdish movement would have been unthinkable without Iranian logistical support. Consequently the Pike Report concluded that when Iran reached an agreement with the Iraqi government and discontinued their own back up to the Kurds, ‘the U.S. had no choice but to comply (Cooper, 2011; Gibson ,2013).

Several scholars, such as a Gundi, Pelletiere, Nehme and. Meho, observed to the conclusions and arguments of the Pike Report when White House’s decision to unexpectedly finish its shore up to the Kurdish movement is showed. Little is somewhat of an exception, since he shows that by January 1975 Israeli and the United States arms transfers to the Kurds began to wane, recommending that White House had merely a partial capacity to sustain the Kurdish movement. Nevertheless, just like the Pike Report Little admits that the Shah was principally responsible for the fact that the Ford administration similarly had to give up its prop up to the Kurdish movement, and he is completely serious on the Ford administration vis-à-vis Kurdish crisis (Gundi, 2012; Nehme&Meho, 1995; Pelletiere, 1984).

Noteworthy is Little's reference to a U.S. intelligence memorandum called The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement. This memorandum shows how Iran since the mid-1960s had helped and even encouraged the Israelis in backing up to the Kurdish movement. It was concluded that without Iranian support, 'there is little chance that Tel Aviv would continue to support the Kurds'. Furthermore, without Iranian logistical back up, U.S. aid to Barzani's movement was severely hindered and 'armed struggle by Kurds on the scale of 1974 is now out of the question (Vis, 2014).

From Gibson perspective, the activities of the Ford administration regarding the Iraqi Kurdish issue were a deliberate outcome of an accurate investigation of overt and secret U.S. capabilities. Gibson claims that, Kissinger, who was already aware previous to the Algiers Agreement of the Shah's misgivings about the Kurdish question, supposed he had convinced the Shah to keep on his prop up. Gibson grounds this statement on a letter which Kissinger had sent to Mustafa Barzani on 20 February 1975, since 'The fact that Kissinger responded positively to Barzani's request to send an emissary' to White House would recommend that Kissinger would have supposed that he had discouraged the Shah from abandoning the Kurds. Nonetheless, this confident response from Kissinger can never be vindicated in itself as a proof for the assumption that Kissinger would have supposed that he had discouraged the Shah like Gibson does. Hence Gibson's argued that Kissinger supposed he had discouraged the Shah from betraying the Kurds is untrustworthy (Gibson, 2013).

Gibson goes to excessive measurements to complain the Pike Report and other experts for adhering to the urgings and conclusions of this report, particularly for the widely held view that the United States had sold out the Kurds in Iraq in March 1975 after the Algiers Agreement. Ironically, Gibson neglects to indication that Kissinger purposely failed to warn Barzani already in February 1975 that the Shah was about to abandon the Kurds and sign a deal with Iraqi government, while he blames the Pike Committee himself of ignoring 'inconvenient facts. Opportunely, Gibson also makes no indication of Mustafa Barzani's indicates that one of the foremost reasons for the Kurds to reject the new offers of Self-government Law of 1974 was the promised shored up from Iran, Israel and US. If

you take these cases into account, there is certainly some actuality in claiming that the U.S. had sold out the Kurds in March 1975 (Gibson, 2013).

Additionally, Gibson actively claims that the Pike Report has distorted the study of U.S.-Iraqi relations and the Kurdish question. Gibson keeps ongoing his disagreement that the U.S. couldn't carry on backing the Kurds since the Iranian Shah's decision to drop his back for the Kurds was fundamentally accessible as a *fait accompli*. For the reason that now neither Iran nor Turkey permitted Israel or the U.S. to use their territory for delivering shoring up to the Iraqi Kurds, Tel Aviv and the White House had according to Gibson no other option but to terminate their clandestine support. Gibson successively uses the *fait accompli* argument as document to disprove the extensively held view that the United States deceived the Kurds in March 1975.

Gibson recommends that this latter opinion is one of the Pike Report's 'most provocative declarations. Conversely, regarding the unexpected break of U.S. support, the Pike Committee had principally come to an alike conclusion in its memorandum as Gibson, in which it approved that the U.S. had to rely completely on Iran for transporting its back up to Barzani's movement, therefore direct aid to the Iraqi Kurds would have been unthinkable without the Shah's collaboration (Gibson, 2010).

As a result, when the Shah of Iran abruptly invalids his own shore up to the Kurds, the Pike Report already concluded that 'the U.S. had no choice but to acquiesce. This appears unpleasantly similar to a *fait accompli*. Hence indeed, Gibson argues that the Pike Report has misleading the study of Washington's relations with Iraq and the Kurdish question through recommending among other things that the Pike Committee didn't take into account this *fait accompli* argument and thus hurting Kissinger, while excellently the Pike Report did elaborate on this definite matter that the United States was essentially enforced to abandon the Kurds. Nonetheless, the Pike Report basically originated to a dissimilar conclusion about US's role.

Also Gibson shows that the Ford administration had no choice in ending their shore up to the Kurdish movement after the Algiers Agreement. However, in principle US still had an

option to save them. There was still the alternative, although costly and undefined of significantly intensifying the U.S. obligation to save the Kurdish movement. Subsequently, politically speaking the U.S. did have a choice in ending their shore up. Conversely, the Ford administration was reluctant to create such a huge disadvantage for the Kurds, and hence finally chose to abandon its Kurdish ally (Gibson, 2010).

In the end, the Kurdish movement rapidly crumbled after foreign aid was ended up. The Ba'athist government misused the condition by declaring a shocking attacking, followed through forced relocations. If one looks at whether US accomplished its stated purposes with the Kurdish movement, Washington policy shaped mixed consequences. Though augmented Iraqi-Kurdish hostilities had limited Iraq's involvement in the Syrian front during the Yom Kippur War to just one division, the Iraqi army was not capable of transferring much more forces besides due to logistical matters. Since U.S. shored up had to be limited to such a degree that reasonable rejection was still thinkable, Iran had to bear the brunt of the Kurdish movement. As a result of the movement, Baghdad government became even more contingent on USSR weapon deliveries which led to tensions with Soviet, because of the Iraqis supposed the USSR weren't transporting materials fast enough. In the end Kissinger flourished in his purpose to cripple the Iraqi Ba'athist government with internal wars, thus Iraq would be less treasured to the USSR and the country couldn't destabilize the Middle East with military adventures, while Iran did indeed most of the filthy duty.

Nevertheless, on the disadvantage, United States policy had also become tremendously contingent upon what became untrustworthy regional partners, similar the Iranian Shah. Principally in March 1975 this matter became serious. When the costs and risks of supporting the Kurdish movement became too high, the Shah of Iran decided to negotiate an agreement with Iraqi government, which had calamitous results for U.S. and Israeli shore up to the Kurds. The second foremost accountability of the Kurdish movement was the fact that in the end it could not be kept clandestine. Mustafa Barzani made indiscreet remarks about U.S.-Kurdish relations. On top of that, the Pike Report's publication in The Village Voice in 1976 discovered many details of clandestine U.S. shore up to the Kurds.

Ultimately, after the Kurdish movement had collapsed, the US severely altered its policy towards Iraq. Instead of putting force on Iraq, Kissinger and the Ford administration now essentially attempted to decrease Iraqi contingency on the Soviet through promising developed relations with Washington (Vis, 2014).

7. Conclusion

During Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Karim Qasim period, the United States relations with the Iraqi Kurds and with Baghdad were essentially unwavering through the U.S. foremost policy for defending its interests in the Middle East after World War II and its two primary purposes. With the 14 July 1958 coup d'état in Iraq, a pro-Western government had been overthrown and Iraq was ultimately even withdrawn from the anti-Communist Baghdad Pact. The United States afraid of that Iraq would turn out to be Communist-controlled, and hence originated to study whether the Iraqi Kurds issue could be useful in encouraging U.S. interests in Iraq and the Middle East region. Consequently US interest in Iraq from the installation of the Qasim administration in July 1958, and attention for the Iraqi Kurds issue as well, was all in the framework of the Cold War because of the fierce rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet for influence in Middle East in general and in the Iraq in particular.

Principally, the foremost policy interest for the U.S. regarding the Kurdish issue in Iraq was that technically the Kurds might be useful in overthrowing Qasim from power. Still, there were plenty of strategic factors for US to refrain from backing the Kurdish movement against Qasim administration in 1961, principally because this would be antagonistic to the US two principal purposes. Moreover, a U.S. supported Kurdish movement in Iraq might also lead to Kurdish activities in Turkey and Iran, vital regional allies to the U.S. Whereas the U.S. sought a pro-Western administration, realistic alternatives to Qasim were unavailable. Consequently US had to continue friendly relations with Qasim's administration thus USSR influence could be balanced. As a result, the U.S. continued a strict position of non-involvement in the Kurdish autonomy question.

The U.S. even feared that a Kurdish movement might drive Qasim closer to the Soviet, hence American shored up to the Kurdish movement was very improbable regarding the Iraqi-Kurdish war. Possibly the most significant matter was that US was fiercely challenging with the Soviet for influence on the numerous Iraqi administrations, while it at the same time had to struggle with the USSR for influence on the Iraqi Kurds too. During this era, US had strong interests in developing loyal relations with Iraqi administrations, particularly when they were anti-Communist like the first Ba'athist government of 1963. However, the United States policy was principally caught up through significant regional player (particularly Iran and Israel) who all had different interests in the Iraqi-Kurdish war. Hence the United States was forced to keep on a careful balancing act on the Iraqi-Kurdish war, therefore influence on both the Kurds and Baghdad could be sustained, without upsetting or disaffecting its regional Arab and non-Arab allies. This vague policy was eventually formulated for denying the development of Communist influence in Iraq or among the Iraqi Kurds.

On the other hand, in the end this overambitious U.S. policy could not succeed because of the tremendously tense circumstances in the Middle East and the many different interests of international players also allies involved in the Iraqi-Kurdish war, which frequently clashed with US's interests. When from February 1963 until July 1968 U.S. diplomatic pressure failed twice to prevent a renewal of the Kurdish movement, US was ultimately more persuaded to let its geopolitical interests concerning Iraq's administrations prevail over its interests regarding the Kurdish issue. This was possibly largely due to the fact that a massive amount of autonomy for the Kurds or a kept on Kurdish movement were opposing to U.S. regional interests, since this could destabilize most of all its vital allies Turkey and Iran. This regional instability could also be subjugated through the Soviet.

During its first years the Nixon administration similarly directed a non-involvement policy regarding the Kurdish issue. Since the Nixon administration concentrated on the main U.S. policy issue, the Middle East was not a priority until the end of Nixon's first term. Still two key events, the sudden British withdrawal from the Middle East in December 1971 with its substantial geopolitical consequences, combined with the serious

turning point of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship in April 1972, would ultimately consequence in direct secret US support to the Kurdish movement from July 1972 onwards. Fundamentally this treaty led to a foremost change in U.S. policy and a perfect break with its non-involvement policy regarding the Iraqi-Kurdish movement. Another significant reason was U.S. concern about nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company by the Ba'athist government in June 1972. The United States purposes of the Kurdish movement were keeping the Ba'athists forces concentrated on the Kurdish movement; therefore Iraq could not declare military-political activities in the Persian Gulf feasibly aiming at Western oil interests, while preventing the Soviets from achieving their regional strategic objectives.

Certainly, Kissinger and Nixon's decision to conduct shoring up the Kurdish movement was possibly encouraged through a mixture of U.S. concern about Iraq's increased importance as a vital ally for Soviet in the Cold War, and appeasing the Shah's desire to become the chief regional power in the Persian Gulf. Fundamentally, from the implementation of the new reaction to the Kurdish movement in July 1972 until its collapse in March 1975 the U.S. sustained a cynical 'no-win, no-lose attitude concerning the Kurdish movement therefore the Ba'athist administration would be damaged.

It's fairly ironic that while Mustafa Barzani supposed he expected support from the U.S. hence he could fight for more political autonomy, US was in fact only interested in the Iraqi Kurds as a political pawn to encourage its own geopolitical interests in Iraq and was truly opposite to Kurdish political autonomy. Among all the US purposes for shoring up the Kurdish movement, there was none that marked sincere US concern for the Kurdish autonomy issue. There is even some certainty in arguing that the U.S. had sold out the Kurds in March 1975 if one takes into account the dramatic collapse of the Kurdish movement.

Basically, Kissinger regarded the Iraqi Kurdish question as the 'eventual Cold War card', which were to be used to increase US interests at the overhead of Soviet's efforts to form a strategic Communist occurrence and influence in the Middle East. In the end, Cold War policy was the prime motivation behind U.S. policy towards Ba'athist administrations in

Iraq, and through implication towards the Kurdish issue as well, during the period from the new US reaction to the Kurdish question in July 1972 until the collapse of the Kurdish movement in March 1975.

One, changeability in U.S. policy was that during the Nixon administration, particularly after the British withdrawal from the Middle East, as well as during the beginning of the Ford administration, it was in US's interest that the Kurdish movement against the second Baathist administration in Baghdad would keep on because of Iraq appeared to become Communist-controlled. In summary, shoring up to the Kurdish movement against the second Ba'athist administration in Iraq was part of a general U.S. policy of the time to weaken any country which had strong relations with the Soviet. Nonetheless, during the presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson, the US directed an official policy of U.S. non-involvement in the Iraqi Kurdish movement, and Kurdish appeals for US's prop up were continually turned down. During their presidencies it was in US's interest that the Kurdish movement objective for political autonomy might be solved and that there would be no renewal or persistence of the Kurdish movement. Particularly a protracted Kurdish movement could grounds foremost regional instability; consequently these U.S. administrations feared that the Soviet could adventure this regional instability for increasing Soviet Communist influence in the Middle East.

Additional changeability between 1960 and 1975 in U.S. attitude on the Iraqi Kurdish issue was that during Qasim's administration the apparently Communist nature ties of Mustafa Barzani were one of the principal motives for the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations for not supporting the Kurdish movement, while the Nixon and Ford administrations no longer regarded this as a problem for transferring U.S. aid. Nonetheless, during the latter administrations the Kurdish issue had become crucial for increasing US interests in the Middle East region. The Nixon and Ford administrations could not be finicky, because the second Ba'athist government had essentially neutralized all of its other domestic enemies by summer 1973, and unlike before 1972 a kept on Kurdish movement had now become a US interest due to the pro-Communist policies of second Baathist government.

Correspondingly, despite of the fact that the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations acknowledged that US would conduct an official non-involvement policy on the Kurdish question, from November 1960 onwards, the Eisenhower administration largely succeeded in not getting involvement in the Kurdish issue. Both the Kennedy- and Johnson-administration became diplomatically tangled, while the Kennedy government even openly facilitated the first Ba'athist offensive against the Kurdish movement with U.S. weapons in 1963 and 1964. While the Nixon administration firstly also followed a non-involvement policy on the Kurdish issue, it fundamentally shored up the Shah in his hostile policy against the second Ba'athist administration. However, the Nixon administration ultimately originated a foremost policy change when it set up direct covert U.S. prop up to the Kurdish movement. The Ford administration sustained this participation policy until U.S. prop up to the Kurds was stopped after the Shah signed the Algiers Agreement with Iraq on 6 March 1975.

Additional changeability in U.S. policy was the fact that during the presidencies of the brothers Arif in Iraq, U.S. officials regarded the Kurdish question as a long-term issue and they no longer supposed it could be resolute by force from either side, while during the first Ba'athist regime of 1963 US still supposed that Iraq could force a armed resolution for the Kurdish question and donated to this military opportunity. Ultimately, in 1967, the United States had returned to its unique policy during Eisenhower's administration that the Iraqi-Kurdish question was an internal Iraqi affair which could possibly only be resolved with a negotiated political arrangement.

Still, notwithstanding of the many contradictions in U.S. foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurdish question between 1960 and 1975, there are some reasons within this policy, and similarly which determined this U.S. policy, that continued steady. One steady reason was the fact that all U.S. administrations between 1960 and 1975 were opposite to a massive amount of political autonomy, of the Kurds in Iraq. According to Kissinger, US had eventually started supporting the Kurdish question 'with the purpose of absorbing Iraqi energies', instead of encouraging Kurdish autonomy issue. In the meantime, US's prime purposes from its central policy for the Middle East continued a constant factor between

1960 and 1975 which fundamentally unwavering U.S. foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurds, in addition towards Iraq. In the end successive U.S. administration between 1960 and 1975 directed a policy towards Iraq that had at its core the eventual purpose of stopping the Soviet from founding control over Iraq, and therefore squashing the Soviets a tactical base in the oil-producing Persian Gulf. The sustained supply of Middle East oil also persisted a priority.

Because of all these U.S. administrations supposed that the Soviet unsympathetically endangered Iraq's authority, US's policy on Kurds between 1960 and 1975 was according to Gibson entirely concentrated 'on Iraq's supposed role in the Cold War framework'. It is certainly apparent that the Soviet and the US were involved in a violent Cold War rivalry for geopolitical influence in the Middle East region, and above all for influence on Iraq after the pro-Western Hashemite kingdom toppled in 1958. AUS policy principally motivated through its Cold War policy on winning support Iraq to the Western alliance and preventing its integration in the USSR circle of influence was only a rational outcome. Both the Soviet and USA used the Kurds in this Cold War challenging over Iraq as regional proxies, whenever this fit their own interests, and with the purpose of promoting their respective strategic purposes.

Consequently during the examined period from 1960 till 1975, U.S. relations with the Kurdish movement were always directly contingent on US's relations with successive governments in Baghdad. Whenever successive Iraqi governments appeared to be possibly anti-Communist, the U.S. directed a policy of reconciliation, while attempting to support the regime's position. In such a condition, the Kurdish movement threat of destabilizing such a favorable government caused in U.S. policy straight opposite Kurdish interests, like during the first Ba'athist government of 1963 and 1964.

Also when the Iraqi-Kurdish war could lead to a condition which could possibly be oppressed through the Soviet, the U.S. directed a policy which attempted to stop a renewal or persistence of the Kurdish movement. Nonetheless when the second Ba'athist government that took office in July 1968 ultimately became pro-Soviet Communist in its foreign policy, the U.S. altered its policy regarding the Kurdish issue and set up

supporting Kurdish movement since it had now become in line with its Cold War policy to do so. The Kurdish-Iraqi War in 1974-1975 had hence really become a Cold War clash with US arming and financing the Kurdish forces, while Soviet supplied advance arms to the second Ba'athist government.

Therefore the main continuous reason in U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurdish issue in Iraq was the fact that it was inseparably tied to thoughts regarding Iraq's alleged role by US in the Cold War framework. In addition illogically enough, the Cold War policy towards Iraq that remained a steady reason in determining U.S. policy on the Kurdish question in Iraq, led to the changeability in US's place regarding U.S. shore up to the Kurdish movement. In the end, Cold War policy was the corporate denominator in U.S. foreign policy towards the Kurdish question in Iraq between 1963 and 1975.

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